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Abstract 
We examine the determinants of the interest rate margins of Czech banks by employing 
a bank-level dataset at quarterly frequency in 2000–2006. Our main results are as fol-
lows. We find that more efficient banks exhibit lower margins and there is no evidence 
that banks with lower margins compensate themselves with higher fees. Price stability 
contributes to lower margins. Higher capital adequacy is associated with lower margins, 
contributing to banking stability. Overall, the results indicate that the determinants of 
the interest rate margins of Czech banks are largely similar to those reported in other 
studies for developed countries. 
1. Introduction 
Czech banks have undergone massive changes since the fall of communism. 
The banks  were  state-owned  at  the outset  of  the transition  and  it  took  more  than 
a decade for commercial banks to be privatized. The 1990s were characterized by ab-
rupt changes in credit conditions, from relatively soft conditions in the first half of 
the 1990s to rather tight conditions, credit rationing, accumulation of bad loans, and 
bank failures in the second half (Kreuzbergová, 2006). Podpiera and Weill (2008) 
and Podpiera-Pruteanu and Podpiera (2008) claim that deterioration in cost efficiency 
rather than bad luck was behind the accumulation of bad loans and bank failures. 
Gradually, the Czech banking industry has been characterized by increasing foreign 
ownership presence (Haselmann, 2006), greater stability, and less government inter-
vention (Turnovec, 1999).  
Drakos (2003) puts forward that a fall in interest rate margins represents 
a success of the market-oriented reforms implemented in transition countries. In this 
paper, we investigate the determinants of bank interest rate margins. Among the de-
terminants, we examine both bank-specific and macroeconomic variables. While 
the former may have policy implications for bank supervision, such as how different 
market structures affect financial intermediation, the latter may convey useful infor-
mation on how macroeconomic policies in general may contribute to the stability of 
the banking industry. In consequence, we may compare the results to evidence on 
other Central European countries provided by Claeys and Vander Vennet (2008) or 
to evidence on developed countries. 
We examine the interest rate margins of Czech banks in 2000–2006 within 
the dynamic panel data framework. In contrast to the majority of empirical applica-
tions in this stream of literature, we base our results on quarterly rather than annual 
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data by employing a unique Czech National Bank dataset on financial statements of 
Czech banks. Anticipating our results, we find that more efficient banks exhibit low-
er interest margins and that banks want to be compensated for more risky activities. 
Price stability positively contributes to lower margins, thus enhancing financial inter-
mediation and subsequently fostering economic growth. This finding is in line with 
Boyd et al. (2001), who document a negative impact of the level of the inflation rate 
on financial sector performance. 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we briefly review related lit-
erature. Section 3 contains the data description and empirical methodology. Section 4 
presents the results and section 5 offers concluding remarks. 
2. Related Literature 
The pricing policies of banks have traditionally been a focus of economists’ 
attention. Typically, it has been emphasized that bank margins are a result of banking 
structure, regulatory issues, and the macroeconomic environment. There is immense 
evidence on the determinants of interest rate margins in developed countries (e.g. 
Ruthenberg and Elias, 1996; Angbazo, 1997; Wong, 1997; Demirguc-Kunt and Hui-
zinga,  1998;  Saunders  and  Schumacher,  2000;  Demirguc-Kunt  et  al.,  2004,  and 
others).  
Large cross-country evidence on the determinants of interest rate margins is 
provided by Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999), who analyze it using weighted 
least squares in 80 countries in the 1988–1995 period. Besides taking into account 
the bank and macroeconomic conditions, they analyze the role of taxation, deposit 
insurance, financial structure as well as legal and country-level institutional indi-
cators  such  as  indexes  on  the rule  of  law,  corruption,  and  contract  enforcement. 
Similarly, Gelos (2009) investigates interest rate spreads in 85 countries with a focus 
on Latin America. He finds that higher interest rates, bank efficiency, and regulatory 
requirements contribute to higher spreads in Latin America.  
Saunders and Schumacher (2000) analyze the bank interest rate margins in six 
European countries building on a model developed by Ho and Saunders (1981). They 
follow a two-step process. First, they control for the effects on net interest margins of 
various imperfections that cannot be built directly into the model (i.e., implicit in-
terest, the opportunity costs of reserves, and capital requirements) so as to isolate 
estimates of the pure spread in each country each year. Second, they undertake 
an analysis of the determinants of these pure spreads (e.g. market structure and in-
terest rate volatility). They find that bank market structure, interest rate volatility and 
bank capitalization matter for the spreads.  
Another piece of evidence is provided by Hawtrey and Liang (2008), who 
investigate bank interest rate margins in a set of OECD countries and focus on bank- 
-specific characteristics. They find bank market structure, cost efficiency, risk aver-
sion,  and  interest  rate  volatility  to  be  among  the main  determinants  of  margins. 
A similar set of countries and similar results are presented by Valverde and Fernan-
dez (2007).  
Regarding Central and Eastern Europe, there is much less evidence. Claeys 
and Vander Vennet (2008) analyze the determinants of bank interest rate margins in 
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–2001 (a sample of 2,279 banks from 36 countries). Generally, they examine the role 
of country-specific bank market characteristics, country-specific macroeconomic con-
ditions, bank-specific characteristics, and regulatory features in influencing interest 
rate margins.  
One of the hypotheses Claeys and Vander Vennet (2008) raise in their study is 
whether interest rate margins are driven by either structure conduct performance or 
the efficient structure hypothesis. Structure conduct performance postulates a posi-
tive relationship between margins and market structure, reflecting non-competitive 
pricing behavior in concentrated markets. An attendant theory is the relative-market- 
-power hypothesis, i.e., only banks with large market shares are  able  to  exercise 
market power in pricing and consequently earn higher margins. On the other hand, 
the efficient structure hypothesis states that differences in interest margins are at-
tributable to differences in operational efficiency across banks. There are two ver-
sions of this hypothesis. The X-efficiency version points out that banks with superior 
management or production technologies have lower costs and subsequently can offer 
more competitive interest rates on loans and/or deposits, leading to a negative re-
lationship between operational efficiency and interest margins. Since these firms are 
also assumed to gain larger market shares, the market may become more concen-
trated as a result of competition. Hence the correlation between market structure and 
margins is spurious (runs via higher efficiency). One way to deal with this is to in-
clude market concentration, market share, and operational efficiency simultaneously 
in the regression. Second, the scale-efficiency version emphasizes that some firms 
simply  produce  on  a more  efficient  scale,  resulting  under  competition  in  smaller 
margins. Again, these firms are assumed to increase their market share, leading to 
higher market concentration. 
3. Data and Econometric Approach 
The data available to us cover the financial statements of 25 banks (nearly all 
the Czech banks) at quarterly frequency from 2000:1 to 2006:1. The source of the data 
is the Czech National Bank’s internal dataset of financial statements on commercial 
banks and building societies. The fact that data for two banks in the sample are not 
available for all periods renders the panel unbalanced. The number of observations is 
562. 
In  general,  our  empirical  model  follows  the literature  (Claeys  and  Vander 
Vennet, 2008; Valverde and Fernandez, 2007).  
NIMi,t = į·NIMi,t(-1) + ȕ1·FEESi,t + ȕ2·CADi,t + ȕ3·LOANSi,t + ȕ4·ADMINi,t + 
+ ȕ5·SIZEi,t + ȕ6·HERFi,t + ȕ7·INFLt + ȕ8·GDPt + Ȉ Įt·(time dummy) + Și + ȣit 
for i = 1, … , N and t = 1, … , T 
where the variables are described in Table 1. As a result, we include bank-specific 
variables to tackle inherent bank heterogeneity, market structure, and macroeconomic 
conditions as potential  determinants of interest rate margins.  Și ~ IID(0, ıȘ
2) and  
ȣit ~  IID(0,  ıȣ
2)  are  independent  of  each  other  and  among  themselves,  Și  being 
individual effects. As stated above, we have N = T = 25. Descriptive statistics of our 
variables are presented in Table 2.  
As the model is primarily empirical, we also tested other determinants such as 
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ment ownership dummy, but failed to find them significant. These results are avail-
able upon request. 
For sensitivity analysis, we also use CADi,t(-4), i.e., capital adequacy lagged 
by 4 quarters. This is chosen with regard to the consideration that the riskiness of 
a banking portfolio as assessed at a given point in time is reflected in interest income 
only with a certain lag.
1 
Before estimating our empirical model, we tested each series for stationarity 
based on the panel data unit root tests developed by Maddala-Wu (1999). This test of 
panel stationarity was used at varying lag lengths using both the ADF and Phillips- 
-Peron statistics.
2 Overall, evidence was found for stationarity of our panel. These re-
sults are available upon request.  
To deal with endogeneity and the dynamic nature of interest margin determi-
nation, we opt for the Arellano and Bond (1991) estimator. This seems to be a suit-
able dynamic panel estimator for us, as we find that the persistence of the lagged 
dependent variable is not high. 
4. Results 
We report the results on interest margin determination in Table 3 and 4. Vari-
ous  specifications of  equation (1)  are  reported.  The specifications  differ  based  on 
whether  we  include  the full  set  of  explanatory  variables  and  time  dummies  and 
whether the model is carried out with the current or lagged capital adequacy ratio. 
Table 1  Description of Variables
Notation  Variable description 
NIM net interest margin, i.e. net interest income/assets 
FEES fees income/assets 
CAD capital adequacy 
LOANS  total loans/assets 
ADMIN  administrative costs/assets 
SIZE  assets/median assets in the banking sector 
HERF Herfindahl index (higher number implies less competitive environment) 
INFL current inflation rate 
GDP real GDP growth 
 
Table 2  Summary Statistics
a
Variable  Mean Std. dev.  Variable  Mean Std. dev. 
NIM 0.00506  0.00341  ADMIN  0.00499  0.00349 
FEES 0.00204  0.00223  SIZE  3.21615  5.53045 
CAD 28.1953  38.3449  HERF 0.14991  0.01397 
LOANS  0.71429  0.19216  INFL 2.54533  1.59944 
GDP 3.73536  1.63834  --- ----  ---
Note: 
a These are unweighted statistics, hence e.g. mean CAD is high due to some small banks with a secure 
portfolio and high capital adequacy. 
1 Presumably more so than for the other banking variables in the model. 
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Subject to various sensitivity tests, the results suggest that less efficient banks, 
as proxied by administrative costs, exhibit greater interest margins. This is beneficial 
for customers, as the finding implies – in line with the theory – that more efficient 
banks pass lower costs on to their clients in the form of higher deposit or lower 
lending rates (Claeys and Vander Vennet, 2008). Higher capital adequacy of a bank 
is associated with lower interest margins. This contrasts with the Ho and Saunders 
(1981) dealership model, which predicts a positive relationship, as net interest rate 
margins  should  increase  the capital  base  as  the exposure  to  risk  increases.  Our 
finding is in line with the hypothesis raised by Brock and Franken (2003), who put 
forward that less capitalized banks have the motivation to accept more risk (associ-
ated with a higher spread) in order to receive higher returns. Analogously, more capi-
talized banks invest more cautiously, as there is more capital at risk (Brock and Fran-
ken, 2003).  
Interest margins are higher for banks with a higher loans-to-assets ratio. This 
indicates that banks providing credit for riskier projects require higher margins as 
compensation (see Maudos et al., 2004, for the attendant European evidence). In-
come from fees and charges does not seem to have explanatory power and we have 
not discovered any substitution relationship in which lower interest margins would be 
compensated by higher fee income and vice versa. Larger banks seem to set lower 
margins. This is at variance with the supposition that large banks may exercise their 
market power and exhibit larger spreads. Gelos (2009) also finds that larger banks in 
Latin America charge lower spreads and hypothesize that this reflects a greater scope 
for risk diversification within large banks. Similarly, DePrince and Morris (2007) 
document that the net interest margin is lower in a group of extra large banks in 
the U.S. This result contrasts with evidence on new EU member states, where no 
systematic relationship is found (Claeys and Vander Vennet, 2008).  
Our measure of competition, the Herfindahl index, is never significant and 
thus  we  do  not  find  evidence  that  market  power  matters  for  the interest  margin. 
Although  the insignificance  of t he index  may  reflect  multicollinearity  with  some 
other explanatory variables, even simple scatter plots do not indicate any pattern. We 
also used the concentration ratio for the three largest banks instead of the Herfindahl 
index, but again failed to find any significant relationship.  
Next, the macroeconomic conditions seem to affect margins, too. While GDP 
growth is not significant (which may reflect the 7-year time dimension of our sample, 
which may not be sufficient to capture the business cycle fully), banks seem to set 
higher margins in a higher-inflation environment. Thus, central banks aiming to 
achieve price stability also contribute to better financial intermediation (Boyd et al., 
2001), which is crucial for economic development (Levine, 2005) especially in less 
financially developed countries (Coricelli and Roland, 2008). Overall, the results in-
dicate that the determinants of the interest rate margins of Czech banks are similar, to 
a large extent, to those reported in other studies for developed countries. 
We also estimated our empirical model by different econometric techniques 
such as the random and fixed effects panel estimators. While this approach is prone 
to endogeneity, these results largely support our aforementioned findings and are 
available upon request.  
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5. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper we investigate the determinants of the interest rate margins of 
Czech banks based on quarterly data in 2000–2006 using the Arrelano-Bond dynamic 
panel data estimator. We find that that more efficient banks exhibit lower margins 
and there is no evidence that banks with lower margins compensate themselves with 
higher fees. The results support the hypothesis that more efficient banking systems 
are supportive for financial intermediation and allocation of funds. 
Price stability contributes to lower margins and thus enhances financial inter-
mediation, too, and subsequently fosters economic development (Levine, 2005), 
which is especially important in less financially developed economies (Coricelli and 
Roland, 2008). This finding can thus be interpreted as additional evidence in support 
of price-stability-oriented central banking. Larger banks are found to charge lower 
margins. Higher capital adequacy of a bank is associated with lower interest margins. 
Our finding is thus in line with the hypothesis raised by Brock and Franken (2003), 
who put forward that less capitalized banks have the motivation to accept more risk 
(associated with a higher spread) in order to receive higher returns.  
In terms of future research, we believe that it would be worthwhile to build 
carefully calibrated structural models, which would be useful for financial market 
stress testing and, more generally, for policy advice in authorities such as central 
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